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is the, law in this area completely settled. The decision in Master,
hbwever, points the way for further appellate clarification.
CPLR 3101(a): Full pretrial examination of codefendants
inter sese despite absence of cross-claims.
3
Recently, the second department, in Lombardo v. Pecora,' 1
13 2
with respect to
unified the law (atleast in its own department)
the examination of codefendants. The case involved a personal
injury action arising out of a two-car automobile accident. Plaintiff
was a passenger in car 1 ; defendants were the owner of car 1, the
owner of car 2 and the driver of car 2 respectively. Defendant
Pecora (the owner of car 1) sought to examine the two codefendants (the owner and driver of car 2). Special term denied
the request. The second department reversed, overruling a prior
case to the contrary. 33 It stated that the CPLR provision which
of proof' 34
provides for full disclosure without regard to the burden
rendered obsolete the decision in Johansen v. Gray'35 and that the
interest of achieving uniformity of practice within the several
judicial departments also supported its holding. "[F]ull pretrial
examinations of codefendants inter sese should be allowed with
respect to all evidence which is material and necessary, even in the
absence of a cross-claim by the moving codefendant against the
codefendant sought to be examined."'136
It should be noted that this decision has significant impact in
the area of third-party practice. For example, in Ciaffone v. Manhattantown, Inc.,'37 it was held that a third-party (impleaded)
defendant could not examine a defendant other than the one who
impleaded him (third-party plaintiff). In an earlier installment of
the Survey, it was argued that the court had not decided the case
within the spirit of the CPLR, 135 and the instant case would seem
to indicate an overruling of the doctrine of the Ciaffone case.

13123 App. Div. 2d 460, 262 N.Y.S.2d 201 (2d Dep't 1965).
132 The first and third departments have already arrived at the result achieved
in the instant case. Henshel v. Held, 17 App. Div. 2d 806, 233 N.Y.S2d
14 (lst Dep't 1962); Frost v. Walsh, 195 Misc. 391, 90 N.Y.S.2d 174
(Sup. Ct. Rensgelaer County), aff'd, 275 App. Div. 1017, 91 N.Y.S.2d 689
(3d 3Dep't 1949).
13 Johansen v. Gray, 279 App. Div. 108, 108 N.Y.S.2d 35 (2d Dep't
1951).
"L

CPLR 3101 (a).

185 Supra note 133.
138 Lombardo v. Pecora, 23 App. Div. 2d 460, 462, 262 N.Y.S2d 201, 202
(2d Dep't 1965).
13 20 App. Div. 2d 641, 246 N.Y.S.2d 298 (2d Dep't 1964) (memorandum
decision).
'I The Biannml Survey of New York Pratice, 38 ST. Jois L. Rm,.
406, 432-33 (1964).
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Unfortunately, however, the court made no mention of that case
despite the fact that it had been decided by a lower court in its
own department. Therefore, it cannot be unequivocally stated that
Ciaffone has been overruled.
CPLR 3101(c) and (d): Defendant's expert may not be called
by plaintiff, nor are his reports subject to disclosure.
Gugliano v. Levy"39 involved a malpractice action against a
hospital and two of its doctors. Defendants' attorneys procured
the services of an expert to investigate and determine whether their
clients were in fact guilty of malpractice. In his report to the
attorneys the expert stated that in his opinion malpractice had
occurred. Plaintiff called the expert in order to introduce the
report in rebuttal to defendants' denial of malpractice. The appellate
division held that it was error for the trial court to have allowed
such action stating:
it permitted plaintiff indirectly to contravene the interdictions contained in the
present practice code covering discovery procedurs, which absolutely prohibit
the utilization of an attorney's work product by his adversary and which
conditionally bar his use, without prior leave of the court, of the opinion of
an expert who had been retained by an opposing party.... Uo

In the last installment of the Survey, reference was made to
the need for amending CPLR 3101(c) to remove the absolute
protection accorded to an attorney's work product. 14' That subdivision stands as a potential threat to the success of any attorney
seeking disclosure of an item, because of the possibility, however
remote, of a court declaring the item to be an attorney's work
product and thereby barring any chance of disclosure. The possibility of such a holding would be especially vexing to the
practitioner in a situation where an item could just as easily be
classified as material prepared for litigation which is only qualifiedly
protected. This point was raised in conjunction with a discussion
of the Kandel 142 case wherein the court used very loose language in
delineating which provision of CPLR 3101, i.e., either (c) or (d),
precluded disclosure of insured-to-insurer statements. It would
seem that the opinion of the expert falls clearly within the purview
of subdivision (d).
It is submitted that the court should have stated definitively
whether subdivision (c) or (d) of CPLR 3101 precluded disclosure
239 24 App. Div. 2d 591, 262 N.Y.S.2d 372 (2d Dep't 1965).
140 Id. at 591, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 374. (Emphasis added.)
141 The Biannual Survey of New York Practice, 40 ST. JoHn's L. REv.
122, 157 (1965).
142 Kandel v. Tocher, 22 App. Div. 2d 447, 256 N.Y.S.2d 358 (2d Dep't
1965).

